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Abstract
Z-Wave is low-power, low-cost Wireless Personal
Area Network (WPAN) technology supporting Critical
Infrastructure (CI) systems that are interconnected by
government-to-internet pathways. Given that Z-wave
is a relatively unsecure technology, Radio Frequency
Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA) Fingerprinting is
considered here to augment security by exploiting
statistical features from selected signal responses.
Related RF-DNA efforts include use of Multiple
Discriminant Analysis (MDA) and Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved
(GRLVQI) classifiers, with GRLVQI outperforming
MDA using empirically determined parameters.
GRLVQI is optimized here for Z-Wave using a full
factorial experiment with spreadsheet search and
response surface methods.
Two optimization
measures are developed for assessing Z-Wave
discrimination: 1) Relative Accuracy Percentage
(RAP) for device classification, and 2) Mean Area
Under the Curve (AUCM) for device identity (ID)
verification.
Primary benefits of the approach
include: 1) generalizability to other wireless device
technologies, and 2) improvement in GRLVQI device
classification and device ID verification performance.

1. Introduction
The Information Technology (IT) centric focus of
the 2002 E-Government Act was appropriate at that
time and highlighted the importance of information
security and privacy [1].
Since then, wireless
communication and Critical Infrastructure (CI) control
technologies have changed considerably and egovernment connectivity now exists well below the IT
internet backbone. Although remaining IT-centric,
the US government has more recently acknowledged
the importance of addressing “rapidly evolving and
persistent cyber threats” [2]. Perhaps of greatest
concern from a protection perspective is that the cyber
threat and attack surface increases as government-tointernet connectivity (exposure) increases through
supporting sub-internet pathways comprised of
wireless WiFi, Z-Wave, and Bluetooth devices.
Cyber physical systems (CPS) include Wireless
Personal Area Network (WPAN) devices supporting
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the Internet of Things (IoT) and CI systems [3], [4],
[5]. Low-cost, low-power Z-Wave devices are among
the sub-internet WPAN support technologies that
enable mesh networks comprised of smart devices [6],
[7]. These networks support data collection and
control [8] via Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems [9]. Mesh networks
are used, for instance, in hospital [10] and electrical
smartgrid [11] applications, both of which are CI
elements within e-government and private sectors. Of
particular risk in WPAN applications is that a security
compromise of one device can threaten the security of
the entire network. Thus, vetting of individual ZWave device identities is critical for ensuring robust
security. This criticality extends beyond CI, with egovernment CPS applications including interactive
public displays and urban intervention systems
(participatory and interactive) that relay information
of interest to the public [12].
Of interest here are CPS implementations using ZWave WPAN devices that 1) lack robust security and
2) which are readily exploitable (hackable) [13], [14].
Device hardware ID and operating state
discrimination for CI security applications has been
reliably demonstrated using Physical (PHY) layer
security enhancement [4], [9], [15]. As discussed in
[16], PHY layer security involves either 1) adding
physically traceable objects to devices [17] or 2)
Radio Frequency Distinct Native Attribute (RF-DNA)
fingerprinting based on PHY device emissions which
overcome limitations of encryption key-based
measures [18]. RF-DNA differs from typical WPAN
defense and security strategies that target higher bitlevel network layers [19], i.e., the Network (NWK)
and Media Access Control (MAC) layers [20]. Using
underutilized PHY information [18] with NWK and
MAC information yields a more robust biometric-like
wireless security strategy that includes [18], [21]:
1. “Something you know” (NWK – encryption
keys)
2. “Something you have” (MAC – MAC address)
3. “Something you are” (PHY – RF Fingerprints).
The inclusion of PHY-based information is most
important given that replication of known bit-level ID
credentials is relative easy and enables unauthorized
network access [21]. The device dependent PHY
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features capture intrinsic device differences resulting
from component and production variation [21] and are
nearly impossible to replicate. The degree of device
discrimination is captured through statistical methods
of feature extraction, device classification (one vs.
many), and device ID verification (one vs. one) [21]
[22]. Discrimination is assessed using 1) an
eigenspace based Multiple Discriminant Analysis
(MDA) classifier, and 2) a nonlinear Generalized
Relevance Learning Vector Quantization-Improved
(GRLVQI) neural network based classifier [23].
Prior research considered GRLVQI for Z-Wave
devices [21] but used empirical parameter settings
derived from related ZigBee work [23]. Given that
algorithmic settings directly impact LVQ performance
[24], with setting determination being a balance
between science and art with “no hard-and-fast rules”
[25], the focus here was on optimizing GRLVQI
settings for Z-Wave. This was done using a 5-factor
full factorial experimental design and Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA), methods commonly used for
industrial process improvement [26]. Optimal settings
were determined using both a spreadsheet search [27]
and Response Surface Methodology (RSM) [28], [29],
[30], [31] with nonlinear optimization [32]. The
experimental design assessment was aided by
introducing two performance measures, including:
1) Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP) for
classification, and 2) Mean Area Under the Curve
(AUCM) for device ID verification.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 provides a summary of Z-Wave
devices, RF-DNA Fingerprinting, and the MDA and
GRLVQI classifiers. Section 3 addresses ANOVA,
RSM and RAP and AUCM performance measure
development. Section 4 presents performance results
and Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. RF-DNA and Z-Wave
Z-Wave wireless communication devices are
small, low-cost hardware devices and are generally
considered less secure than competing WPAN
technologies given 1) originally lacked built in
encryption [33] and 2) the proprietary nature of the
standard making it difficult for third parties to provide
enhancements [34]. Z-Wave follows a similar ISO
architecture to ZigBee, and similarly has a predefined
preamble and Start of Frame (SoF) [35]. General ZWave signal characteristics are known and presented
in Table 1 along with a conceptualization of Z-Wave
PHY packet structure in Figure 1. The preamble
response (the first 8.3 ms of Z-Wave bursts) was
considered the Region Of Interest (ROI) for RF-DNA
extraction. Z-Wave also includes a payload-based
home identification (32-bits) and source identification
(8-bits) [34]. Due to their proprietary nature, further
knowledge of Z-Wave signal characteristics is limited

and thus digital forensic analysis, c.f. [36], [37], of ZWave devices remains an emerging area of interest
[38].
Table 1. Z-Wave Characteristics
FREQUENCY

906 MHz

BIT RATE

40 Kbits/s

SECURITY

None (200 and 300 series
models)
AES 128 (400 series models)

LATENCY

~1000 ms

RANGE

30-100 m

MESSAGE SIZE (BYTES)

64 (max)

Figure 1. Z-Wave device signal characteristics
[33] [34] [35].

2.1. Z-Wave Signal Collection
The work herein considered the Z-Wave dataset
first presented in [21], where ND = 3 Aeotec Z-Stick
S2 transmitter devices were considered for analysis
with all devices serving in “authorized” roles. A total
of 230 preamble responses were collected for each
device at a sample frequency of fs = 2 Msps. Burst
detection was accomplished using an amplitude-based
leading edge detector with a -6 dB threshold [21]. For
signal collection, each Z-Stick transmitter was located
10 cm from a vertically-oriented LP0410 log periodic
antenna, which was connected via a Gigabit Ethernet
cable directly to the USRP-2921 RF input [21]. The
resultant collected Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) was
at SNRC = 24.0 dB. Independent, like-filtered Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was added to
collected signals to achieve desired operating
conditions of SNR  [0 24.0] dB [21], [22].

2.2. RF-DNA Fingerprint Generation
Consistent with [21], NS = 3 RF-DNA fingerprint
features (statistics) of variance (𝜎 2 ), skewness (𝛾),
and kurtosis (𝜅) were computed for NR = 20
subregions spanning the ROI within NC = 3 Z-Wave
instantaneous time domain responses of amplitude
(𝑎), phase (𝜙), and frequency (𝑓). RF-DNA
fingerprints were generated, as in [21], [22], by
1) dividing each response into NR contiguous equal
length bins, 2) calculating Ns features within each bin
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and across the entire response (NR + 1 total bins), and
3) computing regional fingerprint vectors as,
(1)
2
𝐹𝑅𝑖 = [𝜎𝑅𝑖
, 𝛾𝑅𝑖 , 𝜅𝑅𝑖 ]1×3 ,
where 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁𝑅 + 1. A fingerprint vector for
each of the NC characteristics is formed from (1) as,
𝐹 𝐶 = [𝐹𝑅 1 ⋮ 𝐹𝑅 2 ⋯ 𝐹𝑅 (𝑁

]

𝑅 +1) 1×𝑁 (𝑁 +1)
𝑠 𝑅

,

(2)

which are concatenated to form the final fingerprint
vector:
(3)
𝑭 = [𝑭𝒂 ⋮ 𝑭𝝓 ⋮ 𝑭𝒇 ]1×𝑁 (𝑁 +1)×𝑁 .
𝑠

𝑅

𝐶

For Z-Wave device discrimination assessments, a
total of NF = 189 features are computed with
NTRN = 115 Training (TNG) and NTST = 115 Testing
(TST) observations per device. The TNG and TST
data was sequestered during model development to
avoid the possibility of overfitting.

between-group to within-group sum-of-squares, the
Fisher criterion [45].

2.4. Quantifying Classification Performance
Classification is considered for “one vs. many”
scenarios as in [21], [22]. Two performance measures
are considered: 1) SNR (dB) “Gain” (GSNR) defined as
the reduction in SNR for two methods to achieve a
given average percent correct classification (%C)
[23],
and
2) Relative
Average
Percentage
(RAP). Both GSNR and RAP measures consider
figures with %C on the y-axis and SNR (dB) on the xaxis, as seen in Figure 2 for both training (TNG) and
testing (TST) performance of MDA and GRLVQI
using the Z-Wave dataset.

2.3. Classifier Models
2.3.1. GRLVQI Classifier Model. The GRLVQI
classifier employed herein is based on the work in
[21], [23]. GRLVQI extends the squared-Euclidean
distance based gradient descent process of Learning
Vector Quantization (LVQ) with embellishments of a
sigmoidal cost function [39], [40], relevance learning
[41], [42], and conscience learning [25], [43], which
are employed to train prototype vectors to a given
class label [21], [23]. GRLVQI extends GRLVQ [42]
with the conscience learning of DeSieno [44],
improved PV update logic, and a frequency based
maximum input update strategy [25].
As with LVQ and various embellishments,
GRLVQI has five different factors to consider:
1) Factor A, gradient descent learning rate (𝜖),
2) Factor B, relevance learning rate (𝜉), 3) Factor C,
conscience rate 1 (𝛾), 4) Factor D, conscience rate 2
(𝛽), and 5) Factor E), the number of prototype vectors
(NPV) instantiated per class. For all devices used
herein, prior probabilities were considered equal
between devices, with the update logic and GRLVQI
classifier model as described in [18], [23].
2.3.2. Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA).
MDA is both readily interpretable and is
computationally inexpensive. Furthermore, MDA has
shown significant performance advantages over
GRLVQI for many RF-DNA Fingerprinting problems
and it is thus included to provide a baseline
performance reference, consistent with [23]. MDA is
a multi-class extension of Fisher’s two class linear
classifier [23]. MDA considers input fingerprint
matrix F and NC classes and involves an eigenvectorbased projection of the data relative to a ratio of

Figure 2. Z-Wave Testing (TST) and Training
(TNG) Classification performance for MDA and
GRLVQI classifier models.
2.4.1. SNR Gain. GSNR is computed for authorized
device TNG and TST datasets [23]. For results
herein, performance using the full dimensional
(NF = 189) baseline feature set serves as the reference
with an arbitrary %C ≥ 90% benchmark as in [21],
[23]. GSNR is interpreted as:
1) GSNR < 0.0 (negative), a given method achieves
the same %C as the baseline at a higher SNR, i.e.
the method underperforms the baseline method.
2) GSNR = 0.0, a given method achieves the same
%C as the baseline at the same SNR
3) GSNR > 0.0 (positive), a given method achieves
the same %C as the baseline at a lower SNR, i.e.
the method outperforms the baseline method.
For Z-Wave results in Figure 2 at %C = 90%,
GRLVQI outperforms MDA with GSNR = +3.32 dB
(TST) and GSNR = +3.72 dB (TNG). Therefore, when
considering classification performance, GRLVQI is a
superior classifier for Z-Wave relative to MDA.
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2.4.2. Relative Accuracy Percentage (RAP). In
cases where %C ≥ 90% is not achieved, GSNR is not
computable and is thus insufficient for some complete
analysis. Since determining algorithmic settings by
examining possible setting combinations is of interest
herein, the possible lack of GSNR can introduce
instabilities and the RAP measure was introduced
herein as an alternative measure.
RAP is generated by 1) computing the Area Under
Classification Curve (AUCC) values for each method
via a trapezoidal approximation, and 2) computing the
RAP of a given method’s 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀(𝑖) relative to the
baseline AUCCBase method according to
𝑅𝐴𝑃 = 𝐴𝑈𝐶𝐶𝑀(𝑖) /𝐴𝑈𝐶𝐶𝐵𝑎𝑠𝑒 .

(4)

RAP provides the fraction of AUCCM(i) with respect to
AUCCBase and 1) enables a comparison for methods
not achieving %C ≥ 90%, and 2) reflects performance
across all SNR. RAP is interpreted as:
1) RAP < 1.0, a given method achieves overall
lower %C than the baseline
2) RAP = 1.0, a given method achieves overall %C
comparable to the baseline
3) RAP > 1.0, a given method exceeds overall
baseline %C performance.
Applying the RAP process to results in Figure 2
yields MDA AUCCBase = 13.32 (TST) and
AUCCGRLVQI = 15.06 (TST), with a RAP = 1.13. Thus,
GRLVQI TST performance is better, on average,
across all operating points when compared to MDA
(consistent with a visual assessment of Figure 2).
2.4.3. Classification Performance Results Table 2
presents overall results for the Z-Wave data for both
MDA and GRLVQI using AUCC, RAP and Gain.
Overall, Table 2 shows that GRLVQI performs
consistently better across all operating points when
compared to MDA for Z-Wave.
Table 2. Baseline Classification Results
ALG.

MDA
GRLVQI

SET

AUCC

TNG
TST
TNG
TST

16.39
13.32
15.23
15.06

SNR
(DB)
AT %C
= 90%
21.23
22.91
19.19
19.59

RELATIVE
MDA
(TST)
RAP
1.23
1.00
1.14
1.13

RELATIVE
MDA GSNR
(TST) AT
%C = 90%
+1.68
0.00
+3.72
+3.32

(FVR) for the y-axis and x-axis, respectively, of
authorized device Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curves [46]. Two measures are considered
herein to quantify verification performance: percent
authorized [21], [22], and mean AUC (AUCM).
2.5.1. Percentage Authorized (%Aut). Consistent
with [21], [22], ID verification performance is
commonly evaluated by a percentage correctly
authorized from a binary grant/deny network access
decisions based on a verification criteria, e.g.
TVR ≥ 90% at FVR ≤ 10%. Figure 3 presents analysis
based on this threshold (denoted by dashed red lines)
for GRLVQI at SNR = 20 dB, with solid black lines
indicate successfully achieving this threshold and
dashed grey lines indicate a failure to achieve this
threshold. Overall results in Figure 3 show
%Aut = 1/3 = 33.33% success.

Figure 3. Example Z-Wave Authorized Device ID
Verification performance at SNR = 20 dB for
GRLVQI.
2.5.2. Verification Mean AUC (AUCM). Percentage
authorized (%Aut) reflects coarse sampling, e.g.
ND = 3 devices %Aut  [0, 33, 66, 100], and does not
distinguish between perfectly verified results (a ROC
Area Under the Curve (AUC) of AUC = 1.0) and
results that merely achieve the TVR > 90% at
FVR < 10%. Therefore, AUCM is proposed as an
alternative verification performance measure. This
involves computing the AUC for each ROC curve,
one curve is associated with one device, and then
computing the mean of all curves considered.

2.5. Quantifying Verification Performance

2.5.3. Verification Performance Results

Device ID verification is considered in a “one
versus one” (claimed vs actual) ID assessment. Here,
a trained classifier is considered along with
probability mass functions (PMFs) for authorized
devices [46]. Computed for ID verification are True
Verification Rate (TVR) and False Verification Rate

Table 3 presents verification results via %Aut,
AUC and AUCM at SNR = [18, 20, 22] dB; further
verification results will only be considered herein for
SNR = 20dB (the SNR at which GRLVQI achieves
%C = 90%). As seen in the %Aut column Table 3, the
%Aut rate involves dichotomization, c.f. [47],
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whereby the continuous response of the ROC curve is
made discrete, which introduces issues related to
resolution, c.f. [48], [49], [50], and optimization of a
dichotomous response variable is nontrivial, c.f. [51],
[52]. When examining the continuous AUC values,
one can notice slight differences and thus optimization
relative to a continuous variable is preferred.
Table 3. Baseline Verification Results
METHOD
MDA

GRLVQI

SNR
(DB)
18
20
22
18
20
22

%
AUT
100
100
100
0
33
66

AUC1

AUC2

AUC3

AUCM

0.978
0.978
0.978
0.849
0.890
0.944

0.974
0.957
0.978
0.902
0.937
0.961

0.978
0.978
0.978
0.945
0.981
0.992

0.977
0.971
0.978
0.899
0.936
0.966

3. Analysis of Variance and GRLVQI
Optimization Considerations
Due to the small size of the Z-Wave dataset, it is
intuitive that linear methods (MDA) underperform
nonlinear methods (GRLVQI). However, determining
appropriate settings is critically important for Z-Wave
analysis via GRLVQI since this data is associated
with unknown operating characteristics. However,
determining appropriate LVQ algorithm settings is a
largely unexplored domain; herein, a second-order
RSM model will be considered to solve for optimal
algorithmic settings where the target are the
dependent variables (RAP or AUCM).

3.1. Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
General linear models, e.g. ANOVA and linear
regression, work to understanding variability of data
through sums of squares [28]. Factorial experiments
consider all combinations of different factors and
levels to understand significance of factors relative to
the response and the interaction of factors [28].
Herein, a factorial experiment for the 5 GRLVQI
algorithmic settings is proposed, ANOVA responses
will be considered as RAPTNG, RAPTST and AUCM.

3.2. Response Surface Methodology (RSM)
RSM extends ANOVA by considering an ANOVA
model with both squared terms and two-way
interactions:
𝐽(𝑥) = 𝛣0 + ∑𝑠𝑖=1 𝐵𝑖 𝑥𝑖 + ∑𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑖=1 𝐵𝑖,𝑗 𝑥𝑖 𝑥𝑗 +
∑𝑠𝑖,𝑗,𝑖=1 𝐵𝑖,𝑖 𝑥𝑖2 ,

(5)

where 𝑠 represents the number of factors, 𝛣 terms are
coefficients solved for via a general linear model, and
x represents a given factor [53].

3.3. GRLVQI Algorithmic Settings
To consider a full factorial model, appropriate
minimum and maximum values for GRLVQI
algorithmic settings must be developed. However,
little has been published about LVQ algorithmic
settings beyond 1) the general hierarchy of 0 ≤
𝜉(𝑡) ≤ 𝜖(𝑡) ≤ 1 for relevance-based LVQ methods
[54], 2) specific guidelines for specific applications,
e.g. [55], [56], and 3) learning rate convergence
methods, e.g. [55].
Additionally, appropriately
specifying NPV is also critical to avoid overfitting
and/or poor performance [57].
A few considerations were made in determining
ranges for appropriate settings. The operational design
points for each factor appear in Table 4 where the
baseline settings, coded as “0”, are baseline GRLVQI
settings used by [23], [58]. The high (+) and low (–)
settings in Table 4 were determined by 1) taking
magnitudes of 10 times above (+) and below (–) the
learning (Factor A) and relevance (Factor B) rates,
2) conscience rate limits were determined by
considering the extreme settings explored in [59], and
3) PV limits were found by going 30% above and
below the baseline.
Table 4. Experimental Design Region for
GRLVQI
A
LEVEL

LEARN.
RATE (𝜖)

–
0
+

0.0025
0.025
0.25

FACTORS
C
CONSC.
REL.
RATE 1
RATE (𝜉)
(𝛾)
0.0005
0.5
0.005
2.0
0.05
4.5
B

D
CONSC.
RATE 2
(𝛽)
0.15
0.35
0.55

E
NPV
7
10
13

4. GRLVQI Optimization Framework
Results were generated using GRLVQI with THE
Z-Wave datasets for all 35 = 243 combinations of a
full factorial design using values in Table 4. To
determine optimal settings, two approaches were
considered: 1) a spreadsheet search of the full factorial
results to find the maximum classification and
verification performance and 2) employing nonlinear
optimization methods to find potential optimal
settings within the full factorial settings. Sequestered
TST data was used to validate the settings in a process
similar to that of [60].

4.1. Spreadsheet Search
A spreadsheet search, consistent with [27], was
performed to find the highest performing results, and
resultant settings, from the experimental design. The
highest performing results were found for: 1) TNG

2383

results, 2) TST results, and 3) AUCM results. When
considering TNG results, the highest performance was
found with Factor A, Factor B, and Factor C at the
highest setting, Factor D at its mid-range setting, and
Factor E its lowest setting. For TST results, the
highest performance was found with Factor A and
Factor C at their highest settings, Factor B at its midrange setting, and Factor D and Factor E at their
lowest settings. For verification AUCM results, the
highest performance was found with Factor A and
Factor B at their highest settings, Factor C and
Factor D at mid-range settings, and Factor E at its
lowest setting.

4.2. Constrained Nonlinear Optimization
One limitation of the spreadsheet search is that it
only finds best results in explored combinations. To
find optimal algorithmic settings within the design
space, the full factorial results were considered with
RSM. First, an ANOVA model was computed for
classification (RAPTST and RAPTNG) and verification
(AUCM). Next, the statistically significant (α = 10)
features were selected and a second ANOVA model,
with only the selected factors, was then created. The
second ANOVA model was optimized consistent with
[32]; the optimization process employed constrained
nonlinear optimization (interior point optimization),
consistent with [61], and the results provided optimal
GRLVQI settings.
4.2.1. ANOVA and RSM Results. Table 5 presents
the ANOVA table for the model, error or residuals,
and total Sum of Squares (SoS). The model is further
broken down by each model factor (main effects and
2nd order interaction) along with its SoS and p-value.
Although Degrees of Freedom (DoF), Mean Squares,
and F0 are not shown in Table 4, these are easily
recomputed due to the underlying relationships: 1)
each main effect and each interaction has one DoF
each, 2) Mean Squares (MS) for a factor are MSFactor
= SoS / DoF, and 3) factor F0 is computed as F0 =
MSFactor / MSError [28].
4.2.2. Sequential Quadratic Programming (SQP).
A majority voting approach was applied to the
ANOVA models in Table 5 to determine which
features to consider for further analysis. Thus, features
that were on majority statistically significant (dark or
light gray shading) were retained and further ANOVA
models were computed. Constrained minimization
(target values were negated since maximization is
possible by minimizing a negation) was considered
where a finite-difference approximation was
computed by starting with an initial estimate (the
baseline GRLVQI settings). The relationship between
variables was optimized via SQP wherein a line
search was employed [61].

The minimization was constrained between the
minimum and maximum values seen in Table 4 to
avoid computing values outside those explored (e.g.
unbounded optimization yielded settings far outside
the design space, with magnitudes ranging from 1013
to 1042). The optimal solution was then computed for
each factor level with the resultant optimal
algorithmic settings for each factor are presented in
Table 6 along with performance results. Optimization
was considered individually for maximum RAPTST,
RAPTNG, and AUCM. Of note, some optimization
solutions had results that were identical to lower or
upper bounds, denoted with + or –; otherwise, the
resultant uncoded setting is presented.
Table 5. Analysis of Variance Table from Full
Factorial Data. Dark Grey indicates a variable
significant at 5%, Light Grey indicates a variable is
significant at 10% and * indicates a p-value < 0.001
RAPTNG

RAPTST

AUCM

SOURCE
OF

SOS

P

SOS

P

SOS

P

VARIANCE
TOTAL
MODEL
𝜖

0.4459

*

0.3631

*

1.5549

*

0.1595

*

0.1474

*

0.7093

*

𝜉

0.0089

*

0.0113

*

0.0007

0.854

𝛾

0.0190

*

0.0294

*

0.0001

0.886

𝛽

0.0055

*

0.0100

*

0.0023

0.745

𝑁𝑃𝑉

0.0067

*

0.0389

*

0.1333

0.014

𝜖2

0.0743

*

0.0953

*

0.6106

*

2

0.0113

*

0.0154

*

0.0001

0.952

𝛾2

0.0025

*

0.0012

0.035

0.0592

0.098

2

0.0004

0.153

0.0029

0.001

0.0576

0.103

𝜉

𝛽

2
𝑁𝑃𝑉

0.0033

*

0.0236

*

0.0162

0.386

𝜖×𝜉

0.0013

0.009

0.0046

*

0.4835

*

𝜖×𝛾

0.0011

0.020

0.0053

*

0.0105

0.485

𝜖×𝛽

0.0001

0.508

0.0001

0.815

0.0191

0.347

𝜖 × 𝑁𝑃𝑉

0.0001

*

0.0053

*

0.0219

0.314

𝜉×𝛾

0.0003

0.234

0.0001

0.682

0.0001

0.960

𝜉×𝛽

0.0001

0.485

0.0004

0.223

0.0095

0.508

𝜉 × 𝑁𝑃𝑉

0.0001

0.479

0.0007

0.119

0.0001

0.968

𝛾×𝛽

0.0001

0.813

0.0001

0.650

0.0019

0.761

𝛾 × 𝑁𝑃𝑉

0.0001

0.479

0.0005

0.189

0.0004

0.893

𝛽 × 𝑁𝑃𝑉
ERROR
TOTAL
R2
2
R ADJ

0.0023
0.001
0.0423
*
0.4883
*
0.913
0.905

0.0032

*
0.0589
*
0.4221
*
0.860
0.848

0.0032
0.699
4.773
*
6.328
*
0.245
0.178
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Table 6. Algorithm Optimization Results
PERFORMANCE RESULTS
VERIFICATION AT
CLASSIFICATION
SNR = 20DB

FACTORS LEVELS
METHOD

Spreadsheet
Search
Constrained
Nonlinear
Optimization
None

MAX.
OBJECTIVE

RAPTNG
RAPTST
AUCM
RAPTNG
RAPTST
AUCM
BASELINE
GRLVQI
MDA

A

B

C

D

E

GSNR (DB) AT %C
= 90%

+
+
+
0.1573
0.1501
0.1509

+
+
+
+
+
+

+
+
0
4.3746
+
+

0

–
–
–
–
–
–

TNG
+5.30
+4.99
+5.30
+4.51
+5.23
+4.79

TST
+5.78
+5.63
+5.77
+5.27
+5.26
+5.28

–
0

–
–
–

RAP
TNG
1.22
1.22
1.22
1.20
1.20
1.20

TST
1.18
1.20
1.18
1.20
1.19
1.17

TVR

AUCM

66%
66%
66%
33%
66%
66%

0.974
0.977
0.979
0.961
0.967
0.974

0

0

0

0

0

+3.72

+3.32

1.14

1.13

33%

0.936

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

+1.68

0.00

1.23

1.0

100%

0.971

Evident in Table 6 is that both classification and
verification performance improve with the
spreadsheet search and optimized settings when
compared to baseline GRLVQI settings. Consistency
across results indicates that using too many PVs is
detrimental to performance, logically this could
facilitate over-fitting, and thus the LVQ architecture
does not need to be too cumbersome. Although
TVR = 100% for MDA, overall AUCM is consistent
between MDA and GRLVQI optimized results.

5. Summary and Conclusions
From an e-government cyber security and
protection perspective, sub-internet pathways that are
comprised of common wireless WiFi, Z-Wave and
Bluetooth devices increase the cyber attack surface
and risk of service degradation or disruption. Risk
mitigation is a top priority when considering that
hospital, electrical power grid and other CI systems
are vulnerable. The focus here is on demonstrating
measures to enhanced Z-Wave security, with results
being generally applicable to other WPANs.
There are four contributions for improving ZWave device discrimination using RF-DNA Fingerprints, including: 1) introduction of RAP and AUCM
performance measures, 2) formalization of a DOE
approach for classifier model development,
3) demonstration of a GRLVQI optimization
framework for classification and verification, and 4) a
GRLVQI and MDA/ML comparative assessment for
Z-Wave PHY device identification.
Herein, a process was presented to find optimal
algorithm settings by first performing a designed
experiment (full factorial) and then employing both a
spreadsheet search and nonlinear optimization. The
results collectively illustrate that 1) determining
appropriate GRLVQI algorithm settings is critical (the

optimized learning rates differed by no more than 5%
yet produced larger variations in RAP and AUCM),
and 2) the viability of DOE methods for RF-DNA
Fingerprinting algorithm optimization.
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